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This book is an excellent selection for 
undergraduate and graduate students in per- 
formance studies, cultural anthropology, 
Latin American studies, or dance ethnogra- 
phy courses. It is also a valuable case study 
for students who are seeking insights into the 
process of conducting fieldwork-establish- 
ing rapport, employing qualitative methods, 
and participant observation. With regard to 
this last point, however, Sklar missed an 
opportunity to discuss the problem of rela- 
tionships with ethnographic subjects after the 
researcher leaves and the writing begins. 
Sklar only hints at some difficulties: 
My relationship with the people 
changed when I became a writer, an 
outsider, and I felt the loss. 
Something that had been was no 
longer. 
It was more than loss. There were 
loose ends. Differences that in per- 
son could be accommodated in the 
forgiving arms of the fiesta had a 
sharper sting at a distance. The 
assertiveness that was a good joke 
around the kitchen table looked like 
a transgression of solidarity when it 
appeared in print. (178) 
This reviewer wanted to learn more about 
how she handled the problem of "when they 
read what we write." It is a problem that 
fieldworkers face whenever they become 
intimately involved in a community and then 
leave. It also makes one ask, What did the 
people of Tortugas gain from Sklar's pres- 
ence? These are hard questions that the self- 
reflective researcher needs to consider. 
Overall, I found Dancing With the Virgin 
to be a very rewarding book. Sklar must be 
commended for her willingness to experi- 
ment with ways of knowing and ways of 
describing. Her work will stand as an impor- 
tant contribution to the ongoing debate on 
how best to represent and comprehend the 
body in motion, the body in community- 
building, and the body in generating faith. 
Jill D. Sweet 
Skidmore College 
THE PRIMACY OF MOVEMENT by 
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone. 1999. Amsterdam/ 
Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company. xxxiii + 583 pp., notes, references, 
index of subjects, index of names. $85.00 
paper 
Each movement of the body is full of 
soul, the coming and going, the 
standing and sitting, the walking and 
dancing, etc. Likewise, so is every 
human performance, every human 
production. (Edmund Husserl 1989, 
252) 
The twentieth century has restored 
and deepened the notion of flesh, that 
is, of animate body. (Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty 1964, 242-243) 
Animate form is out there in the 
world for anyone to see; it is neither 
reducible to social constructivist 
thought nor nullified by relativistic 
theses. It is the generative source not 
only of our fundamental practices 
and beliefs, but of our individual and 
species-specific "I cans," those pos- 
sibilities of being and doing that 
Husserl called upon us to recognize 
and which we have yet to compre- 
hend. (Maxine Sheets-Johnstone 
1999, 357) 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) published 
Logical Investigations in 1900, initiating a 
phenomenological movement that would 
transform continental philosophy over the 
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next hundred years. Almost a century sepa- 
rates the philosophy of Husserl and Maxine 
Sheets-Johnstone with Merleau-Ponty situ- 
ated in-between. Merleau-Ponty and Sheets- 
Johnstone both admire Husserl; each is tem- 
peramentally in agreement with his idea of 
phenomenology as a stance of perpetual 
beginnings and his suspension of "the natural 
attitude" (the taken for granted) in order to 
discover perceptual phenomena anew. 
Phenomenology is not fussy about its sub- 
jects; a phenomenon is anything that appears 
to consciousness. Thus, the topics of phe- 
nomenology are wide-ranging, but the way 
they lead back to problems of perception, 
consciousness, knowledge, and self-aware- 
ness is consistent. 
I look forward to every new effort of 
Sheets-Johnstone to bring forward the diffi- 
cult methodological issues of phenomenol- 
ogy. More particularly, I appreciate her con- 
cern to elucidate a metaphysics of movement 
that both explains and bypasses metaphysical 
dualism-the notion of a separate animating 
source for matter (and the body) commonly 
stated as "mind over matter." From her 
first book on phenomenology, The 
Phenomenology of Dance (1966), through 
her study of the bodily source of mind in The 
Roots of Thinking (1990), continuing with 
her feminist critique in The Roots of Power: 
Animate Form and Gendered Bodies (1994), 
to her most recent study of movement and 
nature, The Primacy of Movement (1999), 
Sheets-Johnstone's extensive and consistent 
probing of the phenomenon of movement 
continues to inform philosophy of science 
and natural history, and, not least, the study 
of dance. 
Dance in its rich variety is the movement 
phenomenon that the original phenomenolo- 
gists left unexplored. Perhaps its bodily 
source was taken for granted in their circum- 
vention of bodymind dualism, and therefore 
hidden in the human artifacts they studied- 
from the visual arts to music, from psychol- 
ogy to ethics and politics.1 But then, they 
were not dancers, and Sheets-Johnstone is. 
She divides her attention between two tasks 
in her recent book: intuitive description of 
movement phenomena, and reflexive and 
logical argument. She argues convincingly 
for movement as the source of cognition; 
knowledge is first self-knowledge, knowl- 
edge that comes first and foremost through 
"moving oneself." A corollary to this view is 
that knowledge of the world and of otherness, 
as such, begins in "self-moving." Knowledge 
moves centripetally out from "self-moving" 
and gathers the world back toward "self- 
knowing" in a relational process. Sheets- 
Johnstone explains: 
We literally discover ourselves in 
movement. We grow kinetically into 
our bodies. In particular, we grow 
into those distinctive ways of move- 
ment that come with our being the 
bodies we are. In our spontaneity of 
movement, we discover arms that 
extend, spines that bend, knees that 
flex....We make sense of ourselves in 
the course of moving. (136) 
I have watched Sheets-Johnstone's work 
grow and diversify since the publication of 
her Phenomenology of Dance in 1966, won- 
dering why she turned to intensive study of 
natural history and away from dance studies. 
Through The Primacy of Movement, I under- 
stand the importance of her diversions. 
Merleau-Ponty asked us to believe that space 
and time were not "out there," so to speak, 
but "in here," bodily-generated structures of 
perception. Sheets-Johnstone now asks us to 
look into the generative place of movement 
in our living of time and space, its crucial 
place in historical and scientific investiga- 
tions of all animate life. No wonder her lec- 
tures in Europe and America have earned her 
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a reputation as a major philosopher in the 
growth of phenomenology and the informal 
title of "the Merleau-Ponty of the twenty- 
first century."2 
The irony in this is her apparent dislike 
of Merleau-Ponty, and what I consider her 
misguided critique of his work. The chapter 
on Merleau-Ponty is the weakest in her book. 
She needs to discredit his attachment to the 
terms "lived body" and "embodiment" in 
order to substitute the more general term 
"animate form" as more expressive of the 
body's interconnection with all life. But I see 
no reason to parse this way. Animate forms 
are embodied forms, and they are lived 
forms, lived through in the present tense. As 
a term, "animate form" takes us into biology 
and evolution but does not give us access to 
concrete existentials in bolder strokes, the 
chronicles of human interior histories in 
"lived time." Somehow, "animate time" just 
does not do the same thing. Sheets-Johnstone 
also calls Merleau-Ponty into question for 
outdated (by our terms) descriptive exam- 
ples, his use of case studies in psychology 
that would nowadays be discredited, his 
erratic method, and what she sees as his onto- 
logical elaboration (or appropriation) of the 
poetic style of Paul Valery. 
Her critical detour into the semantics, 
method, and style of Merleau-Ponty detracts 
only in small measure from the large contri- 
bution she has made in explicating the episte- 
mological structures of movement or, as she 
describes her project, "how self-movement 
structures knowledge of the world-how 
movement is a way of knowing and how 
thinking in movement is foundational to the 
lives of animate forms" (xv). The Primacy of 
Movement is nothing less than a phenome- 
nology of movement. Relentlessly, it cri- 
tiques reductive materialist analyses-those 
explanations of perception that shrink from 
process to object, from change and motion to 
inert "objects of perception" fastened "to a 
sense" and localized "to a spot" in the brain 
or a part of the body. In short, she is criticiz- 
ing most scientific accounts. In doing so, she 
appeals to the holistic views of Aristotle, elu- 
cidating the metaphysical mistakes of reduc- 
tionist views of perception. They lack the 
very ingredient she seeks to restore: that of 
movement. The dynamics of perception in 
their varieties are unified by the invariant of 
movement-through change and stasis, ebb 
and flow-not solidified into "objects" of 
perception. Self-movements generate percep- 
tion. Perception is best explained by a 
dynamic model, she holds, through internal 
flux and attendant perceptual qualia (or prop- 
erties, such as smooth or broken), what 
Husserl would have called kinaestheses. He 
defined these as kinesthetic correlates of per- 
ception, or perceptual experiences in their 
own right (Husserl 1989, 63). 
Sheets-Johnstone draws connections 
between Aristotle and Husserl through their 
mutual assertion of motion as the principle of 
life and their nonreductive treatment of ani- 
mate forms. She brings Aristotle's concern 
for movement and nature together with 
Husserl's concern for what he called "the life 
world," and lets them resonate in her descrip- 
tions of thinking in movement. Her work has 
further implications in light of pressing con- 
temporary concerns about a healthy environ- 
ment and the relationship of humans to 
nature. Indeed, she shows how we are a part 
of that very thing we call nature-as we look 
out upon what we suppose to be other, only to 
see ourselves reflected back. We have a share 
in what we call other: the environment, other 
animate life. We hone our movement in rela- 
tion to the environment around us, spatially, 
temporally, through touch (most basically), 
and all the other senses. Like Aristotle, 
Darwin, and Husserl, Sheets-Johnstone is a 
keen observer of human and nonhuman life, 
and she is swayed by their endeavors to link 
life forms. 
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Movement is primal, there from the start. 
Quality is inherent in movement, thus also 
primal in Sheets-Johnstone's phenomenology. 
Movement and its qualities are always 
already present in our kinesthetic life from 
infancy on. Matter in its object status and in 
the forms it takes is only discernible through 
the primacy of movement. We can discern the 
material world only through the movement of 
our senses as they operate together. The uni- 
verse is in motion already-and we are part of 
the animate life of everything. But animate 
form is not arbitrary, as Sheets-Johnstone 
helps us to see. On the contrary, there is a 
built-in specificity in the movement of human 
bodies that bespeaks our human nature. 
Sheets-Johnstone problematizes Merleau- 
Ponty's almost careless statement that "in 
man there is no natural sign" (Merleau-Ponty 
1962, 188-189). It is evident that he is more 
exploratory than scientific in his descriptions 
of "the natural" and "the cultural" in human 
life, and that he finally evolves a historical 
dialectic that denies neither the natural nor 
the social. Sheets-Johnstone also questions 
Merleau-Ponty's earlier view that "It would 
be legitimate to speak of 'natural signs' only 
if the anatomical organization of our body 
produced a correspondence between specific 
gestures and given 'states of mind"' 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962, 188-189). States of 
mind neither disrupt the correspondence of 
gesture to anatomy, in Sheets-Johnstone's 
view, nor constitute a break with nature. 
Movement and gesture are full of mind, she 
insistently affirms throughout. Does not 
Merleau-Ponty himself assert in The 
Structure of Behavior the foundational notion 
that he and Sheets-Johnstone emphasize, 
namely, that "Nature...'is there from the first 
day"' (Merleau-Ponty 1963, 133)? 
Through her philosophical sources and 
well-researched critiques, Sheets-Johnstone 
paints a very large vision of movement as, in 
her words, "originary." She does not discount 
the cultural gloss of movement, but neverthe- 
less will probably not win points with post- 
structuralists who like to narrow to local 
instances and jettison the organic whole. The 
larger scope that natural history necessarily 
takes does not square with the cultural con- 
structivist agenda in which the body is con- 
ceived wholly as a cultural construction and 
the organic is semantically disposed of. I read 
in Sheets-Johnstone (as in the epigraph at the 
beginning) an answer to the excesses of social 
constructivist agendas. If the body is perfor- 
mative, as Judith Butler has established so 
convincingly in her works, that does not mean 
that it has no home in nature. If human iden- 
tities are socially constructed and thus gender 
identity as well, it does not necessarily follow 
that the body is socially constructed through 
the same process or that biology and gender 
are unrelated. As sociologist Anna Yeatman 
points out, the central dualist convention in 
sociology is one that juxtaposes the terms 
"social" and "natural." For sociology and its 
poststructural feminist manifestations, nature 
is a residual and limiting term: "Sociologists 
elaborate the value of 'social' to cover all 
aspects of human existence."4 
Sheets-Johnstone shows that the old divi- 
sion between instinctive and learned behav- 
ior is a spurious one that does not accord with 
facts of life. "Thinking in movement," as she 
describes it, emerges in a kinetically intelli- 
gent manner that is akin to the building of 
paths and shelters by animals: "Creatures- 
including human ones-build according to 
what is available and/or at hand, according to 
what the contour of the land allows" 
(508-509). She aims to show with biological 
science that "intelligence is instinctive," that 
animals, humans included, could not survive 
if this were not so (510), and that our move- 
ments in their correspondence to affective 
life are informed by this instinctive intelli- 
gence or "know-how" from birth onward. 
The significance of this lies in the relation- 
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ship she draws between movement and 
kinetic meanings-between spatiotemporal 
semantics and thinking in movement. 
Sheets-Johnstone is looking through a 
larger lens than that of social constructivists, 
one that posits communal values and ecolog- 
ical responsiveness. She argues convincingly 
for nature through what she calls the "pan- 
cultural" significance of human movement 
and that of all animate life. Culture does not 
come first. Nature does. The "I Cans" that 
culture depends on in the development of 
human life from infancy onward are prefig- 
ured in our natural movement potentials. In a 
cursory listing of some pancultural move- 
ment phenomena, she includes the fact that 
all humans move forward more easily than 
backward (we do not have eyes in the back 
and cannot see where we are going without 
turning around); all raise their eyebrows in 
surprise; all eat by putting food into their 
mouth; all reach for things they want and 
back away, or run, from those they fear. She 
speculates that the emergence of modem 
dance came about through just such elemen- 
tary searchings into the felt dynamics of 
human movement, with the understanding 
that movement can mirror "the life of a cer- 
tain feeling" (351).5 Her explanation weds 
body and emotion to movement and nature, 
not necessarily pointing toward Isadora 
Duncan's romantic trope of "the natural 
body," but not precluding Duncan's socially 
based reasons for rescuing nature ither-her 
resistance to modernization and the machine, 
for example.6 Sheets-Johnstone's work aims 
to show how humanity is related now and in 
the past through pancultural movement 
capacities, structurally and functionally. 
Somewhere in our given human potentialities 
lies the possibility for human connection and 
understanding. It would be hopeful if she 
were right, for who would want to live in a 
world where community and empathy were 
not a possibility? 
Sheets-Johnstone's utilization of Husserl 
is one of the main strengths of The Primacy 
of Movement, as she continues in his steps 
toward a less abstract philosophy of essences 
and a more concrete philosophy of what he 
finally called "the phenomenological-kinetic 
method" (Husserl 1980, 1, 117). His later 
project is a far cry from the objectification of 
perception that characterized his first works.7 
Sheets-Johnstone progresses with Husserl 
toward kinesthesia nd shifts toward a meta- 
physics of process, rather than of substance.8 
Her project seems immense as she seeks to 
reverse objectivist orientations, shifting the 
perspective from which epistemological and 
scientific studies commonly proceed. For 
those who care to follow her to the end, and 
this is no mean task, she does effectively 
demonstrate her premise "that movement 
offers us the possibility not only of formulat- 
ing an epistemology true to the truths of 
experience, but of articulating a metaphysics 
true to the dynamic nature of the world and to 
the foundationally animated nature of life" 
(xvii). 
Her thesis can also be stated quite sim- 
ply: Movement is the essence of life; percep- 
tion grows from there, and animal behaviors 
evolve as a result of dynamically interacting 
movement patterns. These themes come 
together concretely in her last chapter, 
"Thinking in Movement," which opens with 
descriptions of thinking in improvisational 
dance. The chapter progresses to issues of 
language and whether there is a thinking that 
lies outside of language. I disagree with her 
implied separation of movement and lan- 
guage, as when she speaks of the advent of 
language as postkinetic (506), a stumble from 
kinetics to language that she herself refutes in 
other places (383). If her thesis is to hold true 
throughout, language, movement, and per- 
ception would be on a continuum; thus, there 
would be no such thing as a prediscursive 
body or a postkinetic language. While infants 
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do not use adult language, the skills for this 
are prefigured in infant life and kinesthesia. 
Thinking in movement and thinking in lan- 
guage may vary in their forms and bodily 
manifestations, but both of them are never- 
theless ways of thinking; as such, they exist 
on a bodymind continuum. One form might 
dissolve into the other at any moment, as 
when we commonly gesture midthought, for 
example, seeking to elicit the spoken word 
through the gestured movement. As Sheets- 
Johnstone herself says: 
There is no doubt then but that 
speech, like all forms of inter-ani- 
mate social communication, evolved. 
There is no doubt either but that ini- 
tial articulatory gestures were 
founded on tactile-kinesthetic invari- 
ants and that these invariants were 
invariantly meaningful from the 
start. Studies in the symbolic struc- 
ture of primordial language in fact 
make the relationship between artic- 
ulatory gesture and meaning abun- 
dantly clear. (383) 
Through the courage of her pen and volu- 
minous research, Sheets-Johnstone leaves me 
thinking in movement-not finished, not sat- 
isfied, but moving to new questions and 
undertows. If movement comes first, where 
is the place for light? The spot for darkness? 
What animates the animate? 
Sondra Fraleigh 
Director, East-West Institute 
for Somatic Studies 
Professor Emerita, State University 
of New York at Brockport 
Notes 
1. Examples of dance available to the orig- 
inal phenomenologists were for the most 
part romantically conceived and seem- 
ingly trivial, as Simone de Beauvoir 
recounts in her autobiographical remem- 
brance of the early 1930s. She confesses, 
however, a fascination for Kurt Jooss's 
The Green Table (Beauvoir 1962, 
138-142). 
2. The comparison of Sheets-Johnstone's 
work with that of Merleau-Ponty began 
with her lectures at the Norwegian 
University for Sport and Physical 
Education at Oslo. She will be editing an 
upcoming issue of the Journal of the 
Philosophy of Sport, an international 
publication. 
3. For Judith Butler's view, see her 1990 
article "Performative Acts and 
Gender Constitution: An Essay in 
Phenomenology and Feminist Theory." 
4. See Anna Yeatman's further discussion 
of this problem in her 1990 
article "A Feminist Theory of Social 
Differentiation." 
5. Like Merleau-Ponty, Sheets-Johnstone 
shows that perception arises through 
organic connectivity. A dance, then, is 
more than its compositional strands, its 
performance, or its opined politics: "The 
world is not what I think, but what I live 
through" (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 
xvi-xvii); "As one might wonder the 
world in words, I am wondering the 
world directly, in movement" (Sheets- 
Johnstone 1999, 486). 
6. Why did Isadora Duncan turn toward 
nature, for example? Ann Daly scruti- 
nizes this more closely as a rhetorical 
turn: "'Nature' was Duncan's metaphor- 
ical shorthand for a loose package of 
aesthetic and social ideals: nudity, child- 
hood, the idyllic past, flowing lines, 
health, nobility, ease, freedom, simplic- 
ity, order, and harmony" (Daly 1995, 
89). But this turn was also rooted, as 
Daly notes, in Duncan's desire to recover 
a vision of the body lost to a rapidly 
modernizing world at the turn of the cen- 
tury. Daly sees Duncan's embrace of 
Dance Research Journal 34/1 (Summer 2002) 124 
nature as an "anti-moder impulse," and 
a refusal of the machine (91). Might then 
Isadora's turn to nature signal her con- 
cern to rescue the body in the face of 
technological assaults, even in terms 
similar to those that Marshall McLuhan 
popularized in his media theories as he 
identified the threats that continue to 
assail the nervous system through every 
ascendant move of technology? Facing 
this challenge in her manifesto for 
cyborgs, postmodern media theorist 
Donna Haraway writes, "I would rather 
be a cyborg than a goddess" (1990, 223). 
Duncan's answer was the reverse. 
7. In his book on Husserl, David Bell sum- 
marizes Husserl's progression in his later 
philosophy away from the vision of 
object perception that dominated his 
early and middle periods (1990, 215). 
8. Martin Heidegger, Husserl's most famous 
student, also developed a phenomenolog- 
ically open-ended metaphysics of becom- 
ing, especially in Contributions to 
Philosophy (From Enowning), his post- 
metaphysical, postfascist work written 
between 1936 and 1938, but first pub- 
lished in Germany in 1989, and available 
in English only in 1999. 
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